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Glossary
Illumination Conscious realization of how to solve a
problem or how to understand the problem properly;
usually quite sudden and emotional.
Incubation A stage of problem solving during which the
conscious mind does not work on the problem; used to be
accounted for in terms of implicit processing.
Problem A situation characterized by one’s inability to find
a way between the initial states of affairs (i.e., data) and the
desired state of affairs (i.e., goal, solution); one knows what
is needed but does not know how to get it.
Problem representation The way people understand the
main features of the problem, particularly what the
difficulty comes from, and what the obstacles are to
achieve the goal.
Restructuring Conversion of the previous problem
representation into a new one.Insight is a sudden realization of the essence of a complex,
paradoxical, or not well-understood situation, particularly the
essence of a problem at hand. Insight is not synonymous with
working out a solution to the problem; rather, it consists in
understanding the gist of the problem through discovering its
hidden structure. In problem solving, insight usually occurs
after the preparatory stage, often following an ‘incubational
break,’ and results in deep understanding why the problem is
‘problematic.’ In other words, insight produces realization of
what the difficulty comes from, what the obstacles are to a
good solution, and why the previous attempts to solve the
problem were futile. Insights like that may be false and mis-
leading, if based on inappropriate or incomplete data, but
nevertheless they produce the unique (sometimes deceptive)
feeling of understanding the essence of the problem. Besides
problem solving, insight occurs in learning, where it produces
deep understanding of a difficult subject matter, and in recep-
tion of creativity, where it leads to the realization of what is
the message of the creative artwork. A particular example of
insightful reception of one’s creativity is the act of understand-
ing a joke. According to Arthur Koestler, every act of creation
includes an element of beauty (ah!), an element of wisdom
(aha!), and an element of humor (haha!). Although in partic-
ular cases these elements occur in specific proportions, it is
always possible to investigate production and understanding
of humor instead of studying the whole creativity. Analogi-
cally, it is possible to examine insightful problem solving in
laboratory settings, with the use of relatively simple tasks, to
replace studying deep insights in science or technology,
providing that such simple tasks are good models of serious
and difficult problems taking place in mature creativity.The Nature of Insight
The Gestalt psychologists introduced the term insight at the
beginning of the twentieth century. It was put forward in
opposition to the trial-and-error account of learning and prob-
lem solving, a stance advocated by the behaviorists. According
to Wolfgang Ko¨hler, Kurt Koffka, and Max Wertheimer,problem solving should not be described as a process
of incremental increase of habit strength because people
(and great apes as well) sometimes work on problems that
are impossible to solve through continuous acquisition
of learned skills. Such problems supposedly require funda-
mental change in the way they are perceived. Restructuring of
problem perception occurs on the basis of already acquired
knowledge but requires additional new elements and – this is
particularly important – new arrangement of these elements.
The problem before the solution is a ‘bad’ (i.e., incomplete or
inelegant) figure, whereas after the solution it becomes a ‘good’
figure. In otherwords, problem solving is a process of conversion
of a ‘bad’ figure into a ‘good’ figure through adding some lacking
elements, along with rearrangement of all the elements of the
problem (both ‘old’ and ‘new’) into a plausible structure.
Max Wertheimer described a little girl who was taught to
estimate the area of a rectangle by counting the number of
small squares intowhich the rectangle was divided. This counting-
the-squares method was pretty successful in every instance of a
rectangle but appeared inadequate in the case of a parallelo-
gram. The girl was unable to find the area of a parallelogram
until she realized a new possibility. She asked for scissors,
immediately cut off the triangular part of the parallelogram,
and put at the appropriate place on the other side of the figure.
In this way, she obtained a rectangle, whose area was easy to
estimate with the already acquired method of square counting.
This example epitomizes all-important aspects of insight: The
‘old’ solution does not work anymore. The impasse is therefore
inevitable. After some break, a new solution appears, which is
quite unexpected. The new solution consists in the use of old
knowledge completed with new elements. And, most impor-
tantly, the new solution is based on the essential change of the
problem perception.
Laboratory studies of insight cannot rely on realistic diffi-
cult tasks, like scientific problems; therefore, some relatively
simple but tricky tasks are usually explored. For instance, a task
may consist in deciphering the meaning of an expression, such
as ‘poPPd.’ The expected answer to this rebus, ‘two peas in a
pod,’ requires not only perfect knowledge of idiomatic English
but also specific mindset and – maybe – an ability to read the667
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as well, such as a series of various ‘matchstick problems.’ For
example, a person may be asked to compose four unilateral
triangles out of six matchsticks; the solution seems impossible
until one realizes that he/she is supposed to build a pyramid.
Or, a person may be asked to convert an equation expressed in
Roman numerals, for example, IV¼ III – I, into the correct
version using just one stick, that is, IV – III¼ I. Such tasks,
though appealing to one’s mental flexibility and the ability to
overcome fixed mindsets, require some specific skills, like spa-
tial imagination (pyramid) or knowledge of Roman numerals
(equation). If so many factors count, validity (i.e., what is
actuallymeasured) and reliability (i.e., howwell is it measured)
of such tasks appears as serious methodological issues.
Stellan Ohlsson introduced a task that proved to be quite
popular and useful in the studies on insight (Figure 1). It is a
much more advanced and difficult version of the problem that
was solved by the little girl, described by Max Wertheimer. The
task is to find the sum of the areas of square ABCD and
parallelogram EBGD, given that AB¼a, and AG¼b. We know
very well that the area of a square is obtained by multiplication
of the length of its two edges, which is easy. We also may
remember that the area of a parallelogram is obtained through
multiplication of the length of its base by the length of its
height, but the latter value is not provided (the former is
possible to deduce). However, the solution is immediately
worked out as soon as one realizes that the needed sum of
areas is obtained through moving the triangle DCE upwards
(or the triangle ABG downwards), so as to compose two big
triangles, and eventually one big rectangle, whose square is
easily computed as a times b. Although this task requires
basic mathematics, its difficulty results from the necessity in
perceiving it in a new and unconventional way rather than







Figure 1 Given that the line AB¼a and the line AG¼b, find the sum
of areas of square ABCD and parallelogram EBGD (Ohlsson, 1984).The Features of Insight
Suddenness
Insight is usually experienced as sudden and unexpected. Emi-
nent creators, on the basis of their introspective analyses of the
creative processes, often report these feelings. Introspection
lacks objectivity, but if the phenomena under consideration
are subjective by nature, it must not be ignored as a source of
relevant data. The empirical psychology argues that similar
phenomena take place in controlled experimental settings,
too. Psychologists also try to answer the question why insight
is experienced as sudden and unpredictable.
Investigations on suddenness are based on the technique
called ‘feeling of knowing.’ People are presented with an intel-
lectual problem and asked to judge their subjective feeling of
being close to the solution. They may use a 1–10 point scale
where ‘1’ means ‘I’m at the starting point’ and ‘10’ means,
‘I know how to solve it.’ It usually appears that this subjective
feeling of knowing rises only 10–20 seconds before emergence
of the actual solution. People are quite unable to discern any
symptoms of the upcoming solution during the earlier stages
of the process of thinking. It also appears that the feeling of
knowing may rise quite evenly in the case of regular algebraic
problems but not in the case of insight problems. The latter
usually produce irregular curves of changes of the feeling of
knowing (i.e., with many ups and downs). If the problem
solver is eventually successful, the curve rises steeply during a
few final judgments but not earlier. This pattern of relation-
ships suggests that insightful problem solving typically results
in a solution that is unpredictable for the problem solver, and
the process of looking for solution is interpreted as ‘cata-
strophic’ or lacking continuity.
Malcolm Westcott demonstrated the phenomenon of
discontinuity in the studies on ‘intuitive leaps.’ Participants
were presented with a series of numbers ordered according to
some principle, for example, 4–5–3–6–2–7–1–?. Their task
was to decide which number is supposed to replace the ques-
tion mark if the underlying principle is valid. Some people
were ready to make a decision only after two or three elements
of the series, whereas others needed more time for that. The
former apparently made their choices on the basis of quick,
spontaneous speculations, rather than elaborated deductions.
In follow-up studies participants were encouraged to guess the
elements of series as soon as possible. It appeared that those
who were inclined to make such ‘leaps’ scored higher on the
independently administered battery of insight problems.
Therefore, such ‘intuitive leaps’ may be interpreted not only
as an illustration of discontinuity in problem solving but also
as a model of intuitive processes in high-level creativity.
Where does the subjective feeling of suddenness of insight
comes from? According to Graham Wallas, the author of the
‘theory of incubation,’ suddenness of insight results from the
unconscious nature of creative processes. If a creative idea is
‘incubated’ in the unconscious parts of the mind, its eventual
appearance must be unpredictable and entirely unexpected for
the consciousness. This theory, although very popular and
influential, was questioned by the proponents of the so-called
‘nothing special’ approach. According to Robert Weisberg, cre-
ative processes do not differ in kind from less creative functions
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scious ‘incubation,’ because they rely on the incremental
process of accumulation of knowledge. The creative process
supposedly consists of consecutive trial and errors, being usu-
ally very long, full of pauses, and tiresome. If a particular trial
appears successful, a person may have an impression of unex-
pectedness of the creative idea. But this is just an illusion,
coming from large number of previous unproductive attempts.
Incubational Break
Even though the theory of unconscious incubation is ques-
tioned for a lack of empirical evidence, there are good reasons
to ask about possible benefits of breaks in the creative process.
The occurrence of such breaks is unquestionable. For instance,
Catherine Patrick observed painters during their work and
concluded that the process of drawing a picture is discontinu-
ous in nature. The artists usually start with an initial idea,
which is seemingly abandoned and replaced by alternative
options. However, the original idea tends to reappear from
time to time, and the whole process of creation makes the
impression of being abundant with breaks and pauses.
Five hypotheses have been formulated to explain the effect
of incubational break.
1. The hypothesis of unconscious activity of the mind,
although formulated more than 100 years ago, still has its
proponents. If this stance makes any sense, an incubational
break must be long enough in order to allow the uncon-
scious mind to work out a tenable solution.
2. It is claimed that a break allows renewal of energetic
resources because creative work may be prolonged and
exhaustive (so-called ‘fatigue-dissipation hypothesis’). This
viewpoint is somewhat opposite to the unconscious thinking
hypothesis, as it amounts to the conclusion that nothing
particular happens during the break.
3. A break supposedly allows redirection of attention from
futile ideas andmisleading aspects of the problem perception
to some new and more promising pieces of information.
According to this explanation, people must change their
activity during the break, possibly to something completely
unrelated to the original problem, because otherwise the
effect of attention redirection cannot be obtained.
4. A break probably leads to elimination of ineffective mind-
sets, false assumptions, and other symptoms of mental
rigidity. If this hypothesis makes sense, it should not be
important what type of activity takes places during the
incubational break because its beneficial effects result
from mere flow of time.
5. It is claimed that something particular must happen during
the break, namely, a new piece of information is perceived
which serves as a source of inspiration and therefore leads
to a new and productive idea. For instance, a person reads
relevant literature or discusses the problem with other
people, and thanks to such events, assimilates new and
productive pieces of knowledge. Sometimes the process of
assimilation is subtle enough to prevent any conscious
realization of the actual sources of inspiration. For instance,
a person perceives an analogical solution in some area
that is distant and seemingly irrelevant to their problem.In such cases, inspiration works without conscious realiza-
tion of the source of a new idea, although one’s mind must
be prepared for assimilation of relevant information.
Some of the above-sketched hypotheses have been verified
experimentally. For instance, Roy Dreistadt demonstrated
that short (eight minute) incubational breaks alone did not
improve performance on an insight problem solving test
but helped to assimilate pictorial analogies that were dispersed
in the lab and served as ‘hints’ to the participants. People
who saw these hints but had no opportunity to take a
break obtained lower scores. These results favor the fifth
hypothesis, according to which the break does not work as
such but serves as an opportunity to assimilate some new
relevant information. More recently, Eliaz Segal asked students
participating in his study to solve the problem of the parallelo-
gram (Figure 1). Participants were given a short (four minute)
or a long (12 minute) break, during which they solved cross-
words (a demanding activity) or leafed through newspapers
(a nondemanding activity). There was also a group with no
break allowed. It appeared that the break resulted in increased
proportion of correct answers but its duration did not matter.
It was also demonstrated that the demanding activity during
the break was more beneficial than the less demanding one.
It is therefore possible to conclude that:
1. incubational breaks work;
2. the unconscious activity of mind probably does not take
place (duration of breaks is irrelevant); and
3. breaks allow redirection of attention from irrelevant aspects
of the problem to the relevant ones (demanding activity is
beneficial).Restructuring
The notion of restructuring is crucially important for the origi-
nal Gestalt account of insight. However, the Gestalt psycho-
logists did not develop any mature theory of restructuring,
sometimes over-relying on metaphors like ‘replacement of
figure with background’ or ‘seeing the problem from another
perspective.’ More elaborated models of restructuring have
been worked out by cognitive psychologists and cognitive
scientists in the last three decades.
According to Stellan Ohlsson, people typically attempt to
solve problems through retrieving relevant knowledge from
their long-term memory, while elements of the mental repre-
sentation of the problem serve as retrieval cues. In ‘normal
problem solving’ such a strategy may turn out to be successful
but if a problem is tricky or unusual, a person runs into an
impasse. In order to break the impasse, a person needs to
restructure their mental representation of the problem. Instead
of trying to find a way between the initial state of affairs (i.e.,
the problem) and the attempted goal state (i.e., a solution),
one aims at constructing a new problem space, where both the
initial state and the goal state are either changed substantially
or replaced by entirely new structures. In consequence, restruc-
turing means that a new problem arises in one’s mind, with
new initial data, new goals, and new constraints. When such a
change is completed, the transformed mental representation of
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which some relevant data, already stored in the long-term
memory, can be used in a productive way.
Ohlsson improved the Gestalt theory through identifying
three separate types of restructuring: elaboration, reencoding,
and constraint relaxation. Elaboration consists in adding new
elements to the original mental representation, so as to make
it complete. For instance, the problem of the parallelogram
(Figure 1) is easily solved if one adds new elements to its
original representation, namely, two big triangles ABG and
DCE. The original representation involves the square and the
parallelogram, whereas the transformed representation con-
sists of just two triangles. Reencoding amounts to sticking a
new label to some old elements of the problem, which usually
require that these elements be included into another category.
For example, the rebus ‘poPPd’ (‘two peas in a pod’) is solved
only if one includes two capital letters (PP) into one category,
and three lowercase letters (pod) into another category. In
other words, the solution requires that the already encoded
elements be encoded again in this entirely new way, because
particular letters must be treated as independent words
instead of parts of words. The third mechanism, constraints
relaxation, consists in abandoning, or at least lessening, some
impediments, rules, or obstacles that previously seemed uncon-
ditional. For example, if the task is to compose four unilateral
triangles with the use of six matchsticks, one has to abandon
the tacit and false assumption that all triangles must be located
on the same plane. Only after such relaxation is accomplished,
one is able to build a pyramid of six matchsticks.The Cognitive Mechanisms of Insight
Selectivity
Janet Davidson and Robert J. Sternberg proposed the selectivity
theory of insight. According to the authors, insightful problem
solving does not differ in kind from ‘regular problem solving.’
What makes a difference amounts to selectivity with which
otherwise regular mental processes are executed. There are
three types of selectivity that the authors believe are important
for insight: selective encoding, selective comparison, and selec-
tive combination.
Selective encoding consists in taking into account some
pieces of information that, though present in the perceptual
field, were hitherto ignored as irrelevant. Alternatively, selec-
tive encoding may consist in ignoring some elements of the
problem as irrelevant, although they tended to be treated as
rather important. These two aspects of selectivity take place
mostly in perception but may also occur in remembering and
concept formation. Louis Pasteur’s discovery is a good example
of selective encoding. Pasteur noticed that grapes with broken
skin quickly staled, whereas grapes with whole skin preserved
their freshness for a long time. These facts were well known to
everyone but only Pasteur understood that broken skin is a
gateway open for microbes. In consequence, he was able to
formulate the germ theory of fermentation.
Selective comparison amounts to discovery of relations
between new facts and previously acquired pieces of knowl-
edge. Thanks to such comparisons people can achieve new
solutions through analogical transfer of knowledge. They usealready acquired knowledge to work out novel ideas, which are
‘borrowed’ from other schemas, or even other domains. David-
son and Sternberg illustrated this phenomenon with an anec-
dote about Archimedes, who had to find out if the king’s crown
was made of genuine gold. He knew the specific weight of gold
but was unable to determine the irregular crown’s volume.
Fortunately, he noticed that the human body, which is also
irregular in shape, elevated water if sunk in a bathtub. As
soon as he discerned the analogy between the irregular
human body and the irregular crown, he knew the solution:
immerse the crown into water, measure the volume of water
pressed up by the crown, which is equal to the volume of the
crown, calculate the expected weight of the crown if it was gold,
and – finally – compare the expected and the actual weight of
the crown. Although anecdotal, this story epitomizes numer-
ous examples of analogical transfer in science and technology.
Selective combination is a process through which people
connect dispersed, seemingly unrelated pieces of knowledge
into sensible, meaningful structures. Construction of scientific
theories often matches this pattern. For example, Charles
Darwin sketched the theory of evolution through connecting
numerous facts from botany, paleontology, ornithology, and
other domains of natural sciences. He provided an explanatory
pattern thanks to which all these facts appeared understand-
able and meaningful. Sometimes selective combination leads
to transformation of the old theory rather than construction of
a new one but in every case this process requires that seemingly
unconnected facts and observations be composed into a new
and elegant configuration.Simplification
Creativity is often impeded by the fact that problems that
require new and productive approaches are incredibly complex
in nature. The amount of data that have to be taken into
account in order to construct a cognitive representation of the
problem may give the impression of being too large for the
human mind, particularly in science and technology but also
in some domains of artistic creativity. Great creators undoubt-
edly possess enormous cognitive skills but nevertheless the
complexity of problems they have to deal with does not seem
compatible with the capabilities of any human mind. The
disparity between what has to be done and human mental
capabilities seems particularly severe in reference to working
memory. This module is specialized in current information
processing, so-called mental combinatorics, and it is severely
limited in capacity. It is estimated that working memory can
keep only about four separate chunks of information simulta-
neously. Four pieces of information may not be enough for
economical shopping, not to mention insightful problem
solving.
Herbert Simon was aware of the problem of disparity;
therefore, he developed a theory of scientific insight whose
main message amounts to the thesis that scientific problems
must be substantially simplified in order to be solvable at all.
Simplification is possible thanks to two independent pro-
cesses: familiarization and selective forgetting. Familiarization
is a long process of getting acquainted with all-important
aspects of the problem. The situation is analyzed from many
different perspectives. Also, many different ideas emerge how
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incomplete. During this lengthy and ‘intimate’ contact with the
problem, its structure is constantly changing. In particular, a
person is able to perceive the problem from a very high level of
abstraction, or – if necessary – with subtlety typical of percep-
tion at the lowest possible level of abstraction. In other words,
the problem may look either simple or complicated, depend-
ing on the level of abstraction. In addition, during familiariza-
tion the elements of the problem are packed into ‘mental
parcels,’ that is, they are composed in chunks defined on the
basis of either content or association with other elements. In
consequence, the problem gets more and more simplified
although it is not deprived of important, building elements.
Simultaneously, selective forgetting allows the disposal of
those elements of the problem that are not important, or even
misleading. In every scientific problem, there are many pieces
of data that are superfluous, redundant, or meaningless. It
would be very advisable to get rid of them as soon as possible,
if only one could tell which elements are actually misleading.
Fortunately, the long process of deliberation about the prob-
lem makes such decisions easier, because what seems impor-
tant at the beginning may lose importance later on, and vice
versa. The mechanism of selective forgetting is especially bene-
ficial from this point of view because it eliminates unnecessary
elements of the problem quite automatically. We just do not
remember some pieces of knowledge anymore, so we do not
have to decide at the conscious level what is relevant and
what is not.
Familiarization and selective forgetting may take a very long
time but as soon as the problem is simplified enough, the
solution appears as if unexpectedly. According to Herbert
Simon’s theory, unexpectedness is just a side effect of simplifi-
cation of the problem structure, which is possible thanks to
two independent but mutually supportive processes: familiari-
zation and selective forgetting.Assimilation
Assimilation is a process through which new elements are
introduced into the cognitive representation of the problem.
New pieces of knowledge are absorbed from the environment
thanks to the ability of the properly prepared mind to exploit
helpful external cues.
Colleen Seifert and her colleagues proposed a theory of
insight based on the notion of opportunistic assimilation.
According to this stance, the creative process starts with ‘con-
frontation with the problem,’ that is, with numerous attempts
to understand the problem and to find a plausible solution.
Striving for a new and valuable outcome is likely to result in
a number of failed attempts so any serious creative work
requires long-term commitment and strong motivation.
When the impasse occurs, the human mind uses so-called
failure indices in order to mark components of the unsolved
problem in the long-term memory store. Thanks to these
failure indices, the human mind remembers its fiascoes: it is
quite easy to remember that one was not successful and to
retrieve required elements of the unsolved problem. The fail-
ure indices make one’s mind rather vigilant, or ‘hyper atten-
tive,’ to pieces of information that might be helpful in
working out a solution.The confrontation with the problem, the following impasse,
and setting up failure indices, supposedly take place in the
preparation phase of creativity. Then, the incubation period
follows, which is characterized by a lack of any observable
problem solving activity. This phase is very important, though,
not because of hypothetical unconscious mental activity but
because of increased tendency of the well-prepared mind to
absorb relevant data from the environment. Siefert et al. do
not agree with Simon’s hypothesis about selective forgetting,
nor with the argument that an incubational break alone is
sufficient for success. Rather, they argue that the previously
prepared mind is very sensitive to those elements of external
stimulation that may be a source of relevant information. The
mind takes a chance provided by the environment. External
cues appear accidentally but their being utilized is the effect
of the formerly performed job of confrontation with the prob-
lem, establishing failure indices, and making the mind well
prepared for taking an opportunity to exploit relevant environ-
mental cues. The experience of illumination, being a culmination
of the creative process, results from unexpected ‘opportunistic
assimilation’ of external cues that happen to be crucially
important for finding a solution to the previously unsolved
problem.Conclusions
Insight is undoubtedly a pivotal moment of the creative
process, so understanding insight results in better understand-
ing creativity. The scientific study of insight brought about
interesting theories, as well as valuable empirical evidence.
However, there seems to exist a serious disparity between
real-life insights, for example, in science and technology, and
so-called insight tasks widely employed in laboratory studies.
Future advances in the theory of insight seem to depend on the
researchers’ ability to unify the experimental laboratory studies
with in vivo observation of genuine creative processes.See also: Remote Associates; Max Wertheimer 1880–1943.Further Reading
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